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Dissonance Orientation:

The Occupational Hazard of Being a Judge
or a Requirement for the Job?
THE HONORABLE DENNIS

M.

DAVIS*

Pierre Schlag's The Enchantment of Reason sells in softcover for

less than twenty dollars. That is a fraction of the price demanded by a
competent therapist, yet the results offered by Schlag are far more
impressive. Scarcely fifty pages into this book, and all my angst about
adjudication and my delusion of the possibility of even the most insignificantly modest of contributions to the transformation of South African
society-where it is only within the last seven years that ninety percent
of the population have finally obtained some rights-had disappeared.
In the words of my new guru (and with the rand having plunged
thanks to those speculators who are also immersed in text, even I can
afford a permanent session at $17.95), "reason is unstable. Law is not
benign.... When reason runs out, but continues to rule, we get precisely
what we see all around us-the excessive construction of a pervasively
1
shallow form of life."
Doubtless there will be readers of this work who will argue that I
am unfair to the purport of this work. After all, Schlag turns out to be
only an American legal therapist. Early in the book he writes: "My
claims . . .refer to American law and American legal thought. The

social and intellectual contexts in which law and legal thought is produced in other countries is likely to differ and to require a different
analysis." 2
What is troubling about this uncharacteristic display of American
modesty compared with the more common exercise of intellectual imperialism is that Schlag's central claims, as I read them, turn out to be
equally applicable to many other countries, including that in which I
work, South Africa. As I understand these claims they can be summarized thus: The claim of law constituting an autonomous entity that
works itself pure through the exercise of reason is a political claim, and,
as Schlag shows in 145 unrelenting pages, it is devoid of any theoretical
coherence. Far from constituting a coherent body, law consists of a
series of diverse linguistic, political, and cultural practices that become
* High Court of South Africa.
1. PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 145 (1998).
2. Id. at 14.
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encrusted with the claim of reason so that "[u]ltimately, cultural and
individual memory are erased." 3 In this way, the members of a legal
community become believers that in doing law they are involved in
"some objective (stabilized) and subjective (authorized) reality greater
than one's self ..

.

These claims have application beyond the borders of Colorado,
New Haven, and Cambridge. Take the following passage from Schlag's
book:
Law-in the sense of authoritative codification-has become the
desired end point of all kinds of political programs from the far right
to the far left. The patriot militias, the Christian right, the pro-life
groups, the school curricular reform movements, the pro-choice
groups, the affirmative action partisans, the gay-lesbian rights
groups-all speak in a legalist idiom and seek to institute their politics in the aesthetics of the legal code.5

This description of how "rights talk" has embedded itself in the political
discourse of civil society is surely accurate, but it reflects a development
that is hardly confined to America. Rights struggles have dominated
many countries' political landscape. For example, for more than three
quarters of a century, the political demands of the African National Congress (ANC) were inextricably linked to a rights discourse. In 1923, the
ANC promulgated the African Bill of Rights, which emphasized the
right to own land. In 1943, the African Claims were published, following the Atlantic Charter's precedent. In 1955, the ANC launched the
Freedom Charter which contained the seeds of what appeared later in the
constitutions that ultimately launched South Africa into democracy. In
1988, the ANC effectively updated the Freedom Charter when it published its Constitutional Guidelines.6 These documents-all full to brim
with "rights talk"-were central to the struggle that eventuated in the
demise of apartheid in the early 1990s.
Rights struggles are not unique to America, nor are they confined to
clashes for control of the nation-state. Without traversing the range of
feminist scholarship, which of necessity falls outside the scope of this
analysis, it is fair to say that a critical reconstruction of rights, particularly the ideas of equality and justice, has been a persistent theme of
feminist political thought and action.7
3. Id. at 143.
4. Id.at 109.
5. Id.at 14.
6. These documents are collected in HASSEN EBRAHIM, THE SOUL
CONSTITUTION-MAKING IN SOUTH AFRICA (1998).
7. See, e.g., NICOLA LACEY, UNSPEAKABLE SUBJECTS: FEMINIST ESSAYS

OF

A

NATION:

IN LEGAL AND
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In short, Schlag's critique of the tendency toward "authoritative
codification"-the casting of political struggles in the idiom of
"rights"-would seem to have unavoidable implications for those (such
as South Africans and feminists) engaged in struggles in other arenas,
unless Schlag is correct in his suggestion that the "social and intellectual
contexts" of those struggles can be shown to differ significantly from
those encountered in the American setting.8
"Heidegger forbid" that the concerns to which Schlag refers should
be extended to include the political and the economic! We now arrive at
the first of the two fundamental difficulties that I have with Schlag's
work. If the analysis of law differs from country to country as a result of
social, political, economic, and intellectual concerns, then the least one
can expect from an analysis of American law is that it should be located
within a similar context. If the kind of analysis undertaken by Schlag
would differ if applied to the law of South Africa, Brazil, Hungary, or
India, for example, then that very conclusion should trigger some
inquiry as to the reason therefor. To summarize, there is a marked
absence of this kind of analysis within The Enchantment of Reason-as

if these concerns may apply elsewhere but not in his own backyard.
The second difficulty concerns Schlag's critique of what he views
as a progressive fallacy that "the good aspects of a practice are essential
to its constitution, but the bad ones are not.

.

." and hence that "intellec-

tual effort can be usefully deployed to reform the practice so as to eliminate the bad aspects." 9 For Schlag, this is a fallacy because there is no
basis for assuming that such separation is possible. Schlag's argument
here is firmly located in his belief that we are all hopelessly stuck in our
own language games and that there is no possible recourse to a transcendent critique that would not be yet another expression of the very normative enterprise so assiduously deconstructed elsewhere in his scholarly
work. 0 But does this claim lead inevitably to the progressive fallacy?
If the answer is in the affirmative, as Schlag suggests so energetically,
what implications does such a conclusion hold for those who take the
business of legal struggle seriously-not just lawyers but also AIDS sufferers, the homeless, or black women operating in a racist and sexist
society? Thus, the claim that law is so universally one-dimensional as
only to admit of a progressive fallacy is the second of Schlag's claims I
wish to interrogate.
SOCIAL THEORY

(1998);

MARY Jo

THEORY AND LEGAL STRATEGY

FRUG,

POSTMODERN

LEGAL FEMINISM

(1992);

FEMINIST

(Anne Bottomley & Joanne Conaghan eds., 1993).

8. SCHLAG, supra note 1, at 14.

9. Id. at 99.
10. See generally Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REv. 167

(1990).

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:853

From this second challenge two further questions follow: Can a citizen use the law, particularly a constitutional text capable of disruption,
to challenge the propriety of so-called proper law and thereby introduce
plurality and consideration of the voice of the "other"? The second and
related question concerns the political implications for a society that was
born out of one form of law and has evolved into another. If one accepts
the argument in The Enchantment of Reason, it would inevitably mean
that a society committed to a constitution which promises transformation
cannot but pursue the "shallow life." Does law inevitably reduce otherness to an "other" unwittingly fashioned in its own image and thereby
(re)produce a community committed to a circular return to itself?
In answering these questions, I propose to show either that Schlag
is guilty of over-egging his post-modernist pudding, or that we should
take him at his word when he says that his challenge to reason has no
application beyond the American legal community. If the latter claim is
correct, this raises a question concerning the basis for assuming a sharp
distinction between law in the United States and law elsewhere, an issue
which relates to the first challenge that I wish to pose to Schlag's central
claims.
THE IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT

It simply does not occur to American legal thinkers .. . to
inquire into the ontological status of law or legal artifacts.... To the
extent that "doing law" is an enterprise of legal advocacy, there is no
payoff in any public questioning of the fundamental artifacts that
make this work of legal advocacy and legal persuasion at once possible and seemingly meaningful."1
In contrast to the legal scholars on whom he pours scorn for their
inability to interrogate the law rather than celebrate it, Schlag devotes a
considerable portion of The Enchantment of Reason, and the entirety of
his most recent scholarly article, 2 to such an investigation by way of an
examination of law's aesthetics. Thus, he finds the forms that recur to
shape the creation, development, and identity of law within four aesthetics: grid, energy, perspectivist, and dissociative.' 3
A detailed analysis of these aesthetics is not necessary for my argument. Suffice it to say that in each aesthetic one can find a particular
brand of legal theory.' 4 For Schlag, the purpose is to "enabl[e] the
11. SCHLAG, supra note 1,at 97.
12. See, e.g., Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047 (2002)
[hereinafter Schlag, Aesthetics].
13. Id. at 1051-52.
14. Within modem legal writing, the grid aesthetic is reflected in the work of ERNEST
WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995), and FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES:
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reader to recognize the various aesthetics of law and their influence on
law and legal professionals-including most especially herself or himself." 5 If the reader has an expectation of discovering guidance as to a
politics of law, Schlag's analysis can only lead to disappointment. As
Schlag writes: "In each case, the aesthetic becomes pathological because
it becomes enthralled with its own logic and thus fails to recognize or
encounter resistance. This tendency is not surprising, given that each
aesthetic constructs or enacts the self in its own image."' 6 So we return
to the starting point: Lawyers are irredeemably confined to the play of
language games, each game confined within its own "aesthetic."
To be fair, Schlag concedes that each of the four aesthetics that he
identifies are powered by their own politics. In light of Schlag's
acknowledgement of a political dimension, I half-expected Schlag to ask
the following question: From whence do these different political forms
emerge? Is there not some purpose served, at the very least, in examining whether these forms of politics are born within a particular economic
and social context? But that inquiry is not the focus of Schlag's enterprise. Because we are doomed, in Schlag's view, to play language
games, we are not able to mount any critique which may transcend our
immediacy. Legal theorists are in a jurisprudential submarine, the periscope of which allows sight of only the water's surface, but no high
ground.
Under the influence of this kind of thinking, legal theory will have
no truck with history. Diversity and fragmentation are the characteristics
of the post-modern world, and any reference to the inexorable unfolding
of global capitalism is to be dismissed as a part of one particular "grand
narrative." Schlag offers his arguments at the very historical moment
when the systemic logic of capitalism, fashioned in the form of globalization that characterizes post-modern legal theory, is once again
revealing itself as it did in the body of historical scholarship ignored by
Schlag but personified in the work of E.P. Thompson, who sought to
show how the growth of capitalism helped fashion legal forms. Born of
his investigation into the eighteenth century political economy of BritA

PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE

(1991).

The energy aesthetic can be found in

RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986), and in BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991). While Dworkin and John Rawls may also
find themselves located in the perspectivist aesthetic, see, for example, RONALD DWORKIN & JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1995), so may Duncan Kennedy, see DUNCAN KENNEDY, SEXY
DRESSING,

ETC.:

ESSAYS

ON

THE

POWER

AND

POLITICS

OF

CULTURAL

IDENTITY

(1993).

NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: ROBERT COVER (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992), and
STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY (1989), are to be found within the dissociative

aesthetic.
15. Schlag, Aesthetics, supra note 12, at 1054.
16. Id. at 1114.
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ain, Thompson's essential argument was that productive relations of that
period were as inconceivable without legal forms as they were without
economic forms.' 7 As he wrote of his historical work's implications for
law,
I found that law did not keep politely to a "level" but was at every
bloody level; it was imbricated within the mode of production and
productive relations themselves (as property-right and definitions of
agrarian practice)... contributed to the definition of the self-identity
both of rulers and of ruled; it afforded an arena for class struggle,
within which alternative notions of law were fought out.'"
From Thompson's work it was possible to distill a clear implication
for legal theory, namely that law and productive relations are inextricably linked such that a separation can only be effected by a jurisprudential apartheid.' 9 By contrast, Schlag's work conceptualizes productive
relations in particular and capitalism in general out of existence, and it
refuses even to entertain questions of historical causality or of the manner in which capitalism (as is so evident in the era of globalization)
shapes identity and social relations.20
This latter approach can only lead to one of two tendencies,
Schlag's aesthetics notwithstanding: Either law is elevated to an eternal
idea of justice and equity, or it is no more than a mirage of reason, a set
of unprincipled and opportunistic rules masquerading as a coherent body
of principle. Ironically, it was against a similar dichotomy that Thompson battled a quarter of a century ago:2" A juridic observance of rights
and citizenship which was to be found at the heart of the Enlightenment
project (on the one hand) vs. an antinomian opposition to the impersonal, other-disregarding rules of law which later became the subject of
deconstructive notions of justice and alterity (on the other).2" Then as
17. See E.P. THOMPSON, THE MAKING OF THE ENGLISH WORKING CLASS (1966);
THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGINS OF THE BLACK ACT (1976).
18. E.P. THOMPSON, THE POVERTY OF THEORY AND OTHER ESSAYS 288 (2d ed. 1979).

E.P.

19. For detailed discussions of the importance of Thompson in particular and theoretical
integration, see Robert Fine, The Rule of Law and Muggletonian Marxism: The Perplexities of
Edward Thompson, J.L. & POL'Y, June 1994, at 193. See also Paddy Ireland, History, Critical
Legal Studies, and the Mysterious Disappearanceof Capitalism, 65 MOD. L. REV. 120 (2002).
20. See Ireland, supra note 19, at 130.

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that postmodernism's fascination with culture
is largely a product of the culture industry itself, of culture's subsumption within the
general process of commodity production; and that its cultural egalitarianism is as
much a product of the value-leveling commodity form as a resistance to it, its
resolute anti-foundationalism sitting remarkably comfortably with capitalism's
melting of all that is solid into air.
Id.
21. Fine, supra note 19, at 199.
II

22. See, e.g., Jacques Derrida, The Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundations of Authority,"
L. REV. 919 (1990).

CARDOZO
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now, those working in the legal field are confronted with a rather stark
choice: Either accept the form of law which presently exists in a constitutional society as a universal good, or dismiss law as a deception from
which justice is but a most distant relative.
Thompson's response to this dichotomy was to postulate the timeless essence of law as a guarantee of equity. He was thus constrained to
argue that the class character of law was a corruption of the essence by
class-bound procedures and institutions which were alien to the law's
own logic, rules, and procedures.2 3 In Whigs and Hunters, Thompson
contended that the eighteenth century Black Act was an example of
"class corrupt law," drafted by bad legislators and enlarged by the interpretation of bad judges.24
Thompson's work is manifestly guilty of "fetishising" the form of
capitalist law and claiming for it the title of law's universal essence. But
if he failed to pursue the logic of his own historical work, the message
remains clear: All forms of life are shaped by the interrelationship
between the unfolding of capitalist relations of production and the social
relations spawned therefrom. Further, the study of eighteenth century
England revealed the extent of the influence of the capitalist form over
25
all spheres of social activity, including the legal system.
By contrast, Schlag does not offer any history suggesting that at the
present moment global capitalism has more totalizing effects upon
humankind than at any previous moment. We are asked to replace one
grand narrative, historical inquiry, for another, the inexorable logic of
the dissociative aesthetic and its foundational premise that law of
whatever form is but an illusion which deceives all but that happy band
of resolute post-modernists. In this way all forms of law, even ones
which may emerge from new struggle, are eschewed. Law is seen
through the prism of the specific limitations of the law that emerged
from capialism's dominance. Like the classic liberals of the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, the essence of law is seen in the way the
system works through individual cases. By means of abstract standards
of comparability, and of retrospective sanctions, and by way of mediation through unelected judicial offices, they are seen as essential to all
legal systems.
This treatment of law not only heralds the end of a politics by
means of a transformed law, but also condemns any use of existing law
as a means of struggle to irrelevancy and possibly naivety. If The
Enchantment of Reason does not expressly show contempt for popular
23. THOMPSON, WHIGS & HUNTERS, supra note 17, at 260.
24. Id.
25. See Ireland, supra note 19, at 138-39.
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struggles for rights, it shows no understanding as to why feminists and
gay rights activists may seek to struggle, albeit partially, through the
law. It is to this second criticism of the book that I turn.
THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS STRUGGLE

To recapitulate the second criticism of Schlag's book, I focus on
the argument that in the post-modern world there is no single unified
process which can be ascertained from historical inquiry and which
moves inextricably towards human liberation. For this reason, it is contended that the discourse of rights has lost any coherence. The lack of a
transcendent standard aside, human rights continue to represent an
expression of a yearning on the part of the individuals and groups to free
themselves from external constraint and allow for self-realization. At
times, these struggles end in dismal failure, but, occasionally, successful
battles have been fought. For this reason, a far more nuanced examination of rights struggles is required than that advanced in The Enchantment of Reason.

Schlag's work focuses exclusively on American law, but no reason
is advanced as to why rights struggles should be analyzed differently in
other countries. For this reason, it appears to be a useful exercise to
examine experience elsewhere. As an illustration, I wish to employ the
battle which has been waged in South Africa by persons infected with
HIV to be provided with appropriate medical treatment by the State.
It is estimated that about 4.68 million people, some ten percent of
the South African population, are HIV positive.26 Notwithstanding the
scale of this epidemic, the government of South Africa equivocated on
initiating a comprehensive anti-retroviral treatment campaign.
During July 2000, the manufacturer of nevirapine offered to supply
the drug to South Africa public health authorities free of charge for five
years. 27 The government decided to make nevirapine available for the
prevention of mother-to-child transmission of HIV at only a limited
number of pilot sites. There was considerable public dissatisfaction with
this approach. As Supreme Court of Appeal Judge Edwin Cameron
observed:
26. The figures are provided in Judge Botha's opinion in Treatment Action Campaign &
Others v. Minister of Health & Others, 2002 (4) BCLR 356 (T), available at http://
www.tac.org.za/Documents/MTCTCourtCase/mtctjudgement.doc.
27. Nevirapine was registered in April 2001 to reduce the risk of intrapartum transmission of
HIV-I from mother to child in pregnant women who are not taking anti-retroviral therapy at the
time of labor. It was registered subject to the condition that the manufacturer continue to provide
data on the performance of the drug. There was also the requirement that the patient be informed
that breast feeding is counter-indicated.
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In my own country, a government that in its commitment to

human rights and democracy has been a shining example to Africa
and the world has at almost every conceivable turn mismanaged the
epidemic. So grievous has governmental ineptitude been that South
Africa has since 1998 had the fastest-growing HIV epidemic in the
world. It currently has one of the world's highest prevalences.28
Public dissatisfaction with the South African government's treatment of
AIDS resulted in the formation of the Treatment Action Campaign in
1998, an organization consisting of a broad coalition of governmental
organizations. The Treatment Action Campaign focused its attention on
obtaining affordable drugs for people with HIV/AIDS; reducing the
prices of essential medicines by drug companies; obtaining a better
health service for all South Africans; and resisting American interference with South African drug policy. 29 Notwithstanding the growth of
support for the Treatment Action Campaign and the intensification of
the political struggle to ensure that pregnant mothers infected with the
HIV virus should be given anti-retroviral therapy at State expense, the
government continued to equivocate.
Eventually, on August 21, 2001, the Treatment Action Campaign
launched an application before the High Court. They sought a declaratory order that the government be obliged to make nevirapine available
to such women where it was medically indicated. They sought to compel the government to produce and implement an effective national program to prevent or reduce mother-to-child transmission of HIV,
including the provision of voluntary counseling, testing, and nevirapine
or other appropriate medicine, as well as formula milk for feeding.
The application was essentially based on section 27 (1) of the South
African Constitution.3" This provision provides: "Everyone has the right
to access to ...health care services, including reproductive health care;

sufficient food and water; and social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependants, appropriate social
assistance." 3
Under a closely related provision-section 27(2)-the State must
take reasonable legislative and other measures within its available
resources to achieve the progressive realization of each of these rights.
28. Justice Edwin Cameron, The Deafening Silence of AIDS, First Jonathan Mann Memorial
Lecture at the XIII International AIDS Conference at Durban, South Africa (July 10, 2000)
available at http://www.actupny.org/reports/durban-cameron2.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2002).
29. SUPPORT THE HIV/AIDS TREATMENT AcTION CAMPAIGN: AN INFORMATION LEAFLET ON
HIV/AIDS TREATMENT (1999).

30. S. Afr. CONST. ch. II, § 27.
31. Id.
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Interpreting section 27(2), which manifestly qualifies the rights contained in section 27(1), Judge Botha stated:
Sections 27(2) clearly presupposes a situation where there is not yet a
full realisation of the right to health care. No doubt that is in recognition of a host of historical and socio-economic realities. It equally
imposes the duty to achieve a progressive realisation of the right to
health care as an ongoing obligation. It obviously does not impose
the duty to achieve the realisation of access to health care overnight.
The pace is dictated by available resources. Yet, in my view the
inexorable goal is a realisation
of the right, even through [sic] it may
32
be achieved progressively.
The court found that there was capacity in the public health sector
to prescribe nevirapine outside of the few pilot sites which had been
established.3 3 Little, if any, evidence was provided to support the government's argument that allowing doctors in the public sector to prescribe nevirapine would throw the system into disarray, cause budgetary
distortions, and set a precedent for the prescription of expensive drugs
for the most esoteric of conditions. The court found that State doctors
should be allowed to prescribe nevirapine after proper testing and counseling.34 Judge Botha concluded that the prohibition of nevirapine's use
outside a few pilot sites in the public health sector was unreasonable and
constituted an unjustifiable barrier to the progressive realization of the
right to health care.35 Rejecting the government's program, the judge
said: "A programme that is open-ended and that leaves everything for
the future cannot be said to be coherent, progressive and purposeful. 3 6
The court ordered the State to make nevirapine available to pregnant women with HIV who give birth in the public health sector and to
their babies in public health facilities to which the government's thenexisting program for the prevention of mother-to-child transmission of
HIV has not yet been extended.37 It also ordered the government to
develop an effective comprehensive national program to prevent or
reduce the mother-to-child transmission of HIV.38 This includes the
provision of the various services sought by the Treatment Action Campaign (voluntary counseling, testing, and so forth), as well as a require32. Treatment Action Campaign v. Minister of Health, No. 21182/2001, 4 BCLR at 382D,
available at http://www.tac.org.za/Documents/MTCTCourtCase/mtctjudgement.doc (last visited
Oct. 24, 2002).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 385F, available at http://www.tac.org.za/Documents/MTCTCourtCase/mtctjudge
ment.doc.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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ment for the progressive implementation of the plan to the whole of the
Republic.
The government immediately appealed this decision, effectively
staying the court's order. The Treatment Action Campaign responded
by obtaining an order that instructed the government to make nevirapine
available in accordance with the terms of the original judgment, pending
an appeal before the Constitutional Court. The legal struggle did not
entail the abandonment of political activity. Public comment and protests continued unabated, indeed building with intensity, until the matter
was heard before the Constitutional Court on May 2, 2002.
On April 17, 2002, the government issued a statement that it would
continue with research on nevirapine and extend sites where nevirapine
would be dispensed until it made a final decision in December 2002
concerning universal access to nevirapine. 39 Contrary to an earlier policy, the government committed itself to providing a comprehensive support package for sexual assault survivers. It stated that such survivors
would be counseled, including counseling on the risks of drugs, thereby
allowing them to make an informed choice, and would be provided with
drugs in accordance with guidelines and protocols if they choose.4 °

Whatever the outcome of the Constitutional Court's decision and
the government's appeal, the campaign has prevailed.4 Nevirapine has
now been made available to a far wider range of HIV infected pregnant
mothers that would otherwise have been the case. Rape survivors can
now gain access to anti-retroviral drugs where previously the government refused such provision. The victory extracted from an unwilling
and recalcitrant government by the Treatment Action Campaign was not
entirely attributable to the legal victory, but rather to a combination of a
successful application to court to ensure the implementation of a consti39. Cabinet Statement on HIV-AIDS, Apr. 17, 2002, available at http://www.gov.za/
speeches/cabinetaidsoz.htm.
40. Id. The statement marked a total reversal of previous government statements with regard
to anti-retroviral therapy in general and to the provision of anti-retroviral therapy to rape victims
in particular. See, e.g., Belinda Beresford, Opinion: What Bent Mbeki, DAILY MAIL & GUARDIAN,
(Apr. 19, 2002), at http://www.aegis.com/news/dmg/2002/MG020414.html.
The story that HIV causes Aids [sic] is being promoted through lies, pseudoscience, violence, terrorism and deception ....
We are urged to abandon science
and adopt the religion and superstition that HIV exists and that it causes Aids [sic].

We refuse to be agents for using our people as guinea pigs and have a responsibility
to defeat the intended genocide and dehumanisation of the African child, mother,

family and society.
Id. (quoting Peter Mokaba, ANC Chief Electoral Officer, Statement, Mar. 2002) (last visited Oct.
24, 2002).
41. As this Article was being edited for publication, the Constitutional Court handed down its
judgment, in essence upholding the finding of the lower court. See Minister of Health v.
Treatment Action Campaign, No. 2002(10), BCLR1033(cc).
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tutional right to health care, coupled with an intensification of political
campaigns. It could be argued that the manner in which the application
was brought to court added to the intensity with which the political campaign was waged by heightening public awareness of the struggle.
The lesson of the Treatment Action Campaign is that rights may
represent nothing more than a negative principle functioning as a means
of resistance to unjust practices without a definite content. Strategically
employed in order to force government to be accountable to the
promises it made (in this case via the constitution) and which it has no
intention of implementing, coupled with political action, rights struggles
can represent a most effective form of resistance to an unjust practice.
The Enchantment of Reason provides no explanation nor recognition of
such developments. It simply replies that they do not happen in the
United States of America. This is surely an insufficient defense to this
criticism of the theoretical understanding of law developed in Schlag's
book. If the reply is that such struggles are representative of the delusion
of those who employ the law in this fashion, then this really reduces to
contempt for any human agency other than the deconstruction developed
in the office of the postmodem academic.
CONCLUSION

The absence of history and the unrelenting critique of rights based
upon a universal form of law lie at the root of the despair which ultimately engulfs Schlag's work. Although I agree that law in its modernist form is characterized by universalism and sameness, a cursory
examination of the modernist project's historical roots reveals that the
latter contains, at the very least, the rudiments of another political project based upon equality, freedom, and liberation.
The record of rights struggles that have sought to push these boundaries has indeed been patchy. Thus, Sarat and Scheingold suggest that
"cause lawyering" tends to lead toward liberal rather than egalitarian
democracy, though they concede that occasionally, and "usually ephemerally," cause lawyering has been able to thrive on an egalitarian, redistributive democratic agenda.42 The struggle waged in South Africa for
adequate medical treatment for HIV patients may well defy precise classification. However, the campaign, which culminated in legal challenge
and victory, held the state accountable to egalitarian commitments made
in terms of the constitution and thereby helped save hundreds of
thousands of lives.
42.
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DISSONANCE ORIENTATION

These legal campaigns point to the direction that the critical legal
project should follow. To assert that we need to look to love alone as
the panacea for the ills of our society is to ignore that love is all that a
community possesses when confronted with the fall of politics and law.
It may be easier to write a book in which law's pretensions are stripped
bare than it is to engage in a project designed to work for political integration, love, and law without privileging one in isolation.4 3 Nevertheless, it is to the latter project that we should be exercising our minds and
energy at the very time that the force of global capitalism remains
unchecked, save for the neo-fascism of the new century. Being a religious fundamentalist, I must conclude (sadly, given the enchanted offer
from Schlag) that politics is a contested business, curiously inelegant,
unhappily incoherent, and that Karl's employment of the dialectic rather
than Schlag's employment of thunderous laughter, is a better cure for
our condition in the first decade of the new century.

43. See Fine, supra note 19, at 210.

